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Abstract
This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift
games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-
updating. Analytical conjectures using pair approximation were compared with the numerical
results. Results indicate that general statements asserting that the lattice structure enhances
cooperation are misleading.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games in complex networks have recently attracted attention in evolutionary
biology, behavioral science and statistical physics [1–3]. One of the most important questions
in these fields is how network structure affects the evolution of cooperative behavior [4–
9]. Nowak and May noted that the lattice structure enhances cooperative behavior in the
prisoner’s dilemma game [4]. Currently lattice structure is considered one of the mechanisms
that support cooperation [1, 10]. However, Hauert and Doebeli found that lattice structure
often inhibits cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game [11, 12]. Thus, it is not clear how
lattice structure affects the evolution of cooperation in general situation. Lattice structure
are characteristically predisposed to high clustering. The purpose of this study was to
establish a theoretical formula that describes the influence of the clustering coefficient in
evolutionary games. Moreover, the effects of the lattice structure. have been clarified The
pair approximation technique was applied to obtain an analytical solution [13, 14].
The clustering coefficient is used to measure the tendency of nodes in a network to cluster
together [15]. The clustering coefficient of a single node is defined as the probability that
two randomly selected neighbors are connected to each other. The clustering coefficient C
of the entire network is determined by averaging the clustering coefficients of all nodes. For
many social networks, such as file actor collaborations [15], telephone calls [16], e-mails [17],
sexual relationships [18], and citation networks [19], the clustering coefficients are greater
than those of randomly established networks. Although several studies have examined the
effects of clustering on the organization of cooperation [8, 9], there is little agreement as to
whether clustering promotes or inhibits the evolution of cooperation. This study considers
models with four different strategy-updating rules and presents analytical predictions.
II. MODELS
Consider a static network with n nodes. An individual occupies each node. Individuals
play games with all neighbors and their reproduction depends on the average payoff of a
sequence of games. The snowdrift game is considered as an example. An individual chooses
one of the two strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). The payoff matrix is given by
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[11]
C D
C
D

 b− c/2 b− c
b 0

 , (1)
where the positive parameters b and c represent the benefit and cost of cooperation, respec-
tively. The cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation is defined by r = c/(2b − c). When
r < 1 (i.e., b > c), the snowdrift game has an inner Nash equilibrium, where the cooperator
frequency is 1− r. In this case, the two strategies coexist in a well-mixed population. This
type of game is also known as the hawk-dove or chicken game.
Next, the networks on which this evolutionary game is performed are defined. All notes
were assumed to have same degree z (the number of neighbors) to focus on the network clus-
ter coefficient effects. We used a random regular graph with a high clustering coefficient.
The edge exchange method [21] that selects two links randomly and repetitively was used
to construct the graph. The links were rewired only when the new network configuration
was connected and had a larger clustering coefficient. In addition, three types of regular
lattices with periodic boundary conditions were used: square lattice with von Neumann
neighborhood (z = 4), hexagonal lattice (z = 6), and square lattice with Moore neighbor-
hood (z = 8). The clustering coefficient C is calculated as zero for the von Neumann lattice,
although it is highly clustered.
The strategy was assumed to be updated stochastically and asynchronously. These are
natural assumptions because strategy selection is not deterministic and occurs simultane-
ously in the population. Four different strategy-updating rules were selected [7, 11].
1. Birth-death (BD). Choose an individual i with probability proportional to its fitness
fi. Then, choose another individual j among the neighbors of individual i. Individual
j adopts the strategy of individual i.
2. Death-birth (DB). Choose an individual i at random. Then, choose another individual
j among the neighbors of individual i with probability proportional to fitness fj.
Individual i adopts the strategy of individual j.
3. Imitation (IM). Choose an individual i at random. Then, choose another individual
j among individual i and its neighbors with probability proportional to its fitness.
Individual i adopts the strategy of individual j.
3
4. Local competition (LC). Choose an individual i at random and then choose another
individual j among its neighbors randomly. Individual j adopts the strategy of indi-
vidual i with probability fi/(fi + fj).
The fitness fi of individual i is given by 1 − w + wPi, where Pi is the average payoff of
all its neighbors. The parameter w is the intensity of selection [1, 7]. We assumed a weak
selection with small w. This weak selection assumption allowed the pair approximation to
be performed analytically within reason of what occurs in the biological world.
III. ANALYTICAL PREDICTIONS
A pair approximation was used to calculate the equilibrium state. Let pC and pD be
the densities of cooperators (C) and defectors (D), respectively. The pair densities taken
into consideration pCC , pCD and pDD represented the frequency that two neighboring pairs
were CC, CD or DD. Pairs CD and DC were not distinguished from each other. Thus,
pCC + pDD + pCD = 1. The conditional probabilities pC|C and pD|D is given by
pC|C = pCC/pC , pD|D = pDD/pD. (2)
Considering pC = pCC + pCD/2 and pD = pDD + pCD/2, the densities pC , pD, pCC , pCD and
pDD are represented as functions of pC|C and pD|D:
pC =
1− pD|D
2− pC|C − pD|D
,
pD =
1− pC|C
2− pC|C − pD|D
,
pCC =
pC|C(1− pD|D)
2− pC|C − pD|D
, (3)
pCD =
2(1− pC|C)(1− pD|D)
2− pC|C − pD|D
,
pDD =
pD|D(1− pC|C)
2− pC|C − pD|D
.
A triplet, which includes three nodes, can be one of two different configurations. The triad
has a node connected with two other nodes that do not connect with each other. The
triangle configuration is when all three nodes connected. The standard pair approximation
4
for a triad [13] leads to
p∠CCD ≈
PCCPCD
2PC
p∠CDD ≈
PDDPCD
2PD
.
However, the use of an extended pair approximation [14] for a triangle provides
p△CCD : p△CDD ≈
pCCpCDpCD
pCpCpD
:
pCDpCDpDD
pCpDpD
= pC|C : pD|D.
The first approximate equality was calculated from the Kirkwood superposition approxima-
tion [22, 23]. Therefore, we obtained
pC|CD ≈ (1− C)pC|C + C
pC|C
pC|C + pD|D
,
pD|DC ≈ (1− C)pD|D + C
pD|D
pC|C + pD|D
,
(4)
where C represents the clustering coefficient, pC|CD is the probability that a neighbor of the
end cooperator of a CD pair is a cooperator, and pD|DC is the probability that a neighbor
of the end defector of a CD pair is a defector.
A cooperator can become a defector only when at least one defector exists in the neighbor-
hood of the cooperator, and vice versa for all four strategy-updating rules Thus, a strategy
can be replaced only in CD pairs. In the strategy-updating cases of BD and LC, the prob-
ability to choose C among a CD pair is proportional to the average fitness
1− w + w[b− c+
c
2
(1− 1/z)pC|CD], (5)
while the probability to choose D is proportional to
1− w + w[b− b(1 − 1/z)pD|DC ]. (6)
The necessary condition for equilibrium is that (5) equals to (6). This condition is simplified
as
c
2
pC|CD + b pD|DC =
c
1− 1/z
(7)
If eq. (7) is correct, the strategy changing rates coincide with each other:
PC→D = PD→C. (8)
In addition, in the equilibrium state, the rate at which CD pairs become CC needs to
equal the rate at which CC pairs become CD. The rate of change of the doublet density is
5
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FIG. 1. The density pc of cooperators plotted as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r = c/(2b−c)
for four different updating rules. The clustering coefficient was set to C = 0, 0.25, and 0.5 for fixed
z = 4 and w = 0.5. The system size was 10,000. In all simulations, pc was obtained by averaging
the last 10,000 time steps after the first 10,000 ones, and each point resulted from 10 different
realizations. The lines represent the predictions (12) for BD and LC, (13) for DB, and (14) for IM.
given by
PCD→CC = [1 + (z − 1)(1− pD|DC)]PD→C (9)
PCC→CD = (z − 1)pC|CDPC→D. (10)
Since PCD→CC = PCC→CD and eq. (8), another condition is
pC|CD + pD|DC =
z
z − 1
. (11)
Solving the system of eqs. (7) and (11), yields the equilibrium solutions of pC|CD and pD|DC.
Using (3) and (4), the cooperator equilibrium density was calculated as
pc = −
z − C(z − 1)
z − 2− C(z − 1)
(
r −
1
2
)
+
1
2
. (12)
The result (12) is valid for BD and LC.
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FIG. 2. The density pc of cooperators plotted for four different updating rules. The degree was
set to z = 4, 6 and 8 for fixed C = 0 and w = 0.5. Lines represent predictions (12) for BD and
LC, (13) for DB, and (14) for IM. Other parameter values are the same as in Fig. 1
It is more complicated to obtain a pair approximation that involves the effect of triangles
in the case of DB and IM updating The condition (11) is also valid in these cases. The
following are conjecture equations
pc = −
[z − C(z − 1)](z − 1)
[z − 2− C(z − 1)](z + 1)
(
r −
1
2
−
1
z − 1
)
+
1
2
(13)
for DB updating, and
pc = −
[z − C(z − 1)](z − 1)
[z − 2− C(z − 1)](z + 1)
[
r −
1
2
−
z
(z + 2)(z − 1)
]
+
1
2
(14)
for IM updating. Although eqs. (13) and (14) can be calculated by analogy with (12). proper
deviation do not exist yet.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
.
To confirm the predictions presented in the previous section, numerical results were per-
formed for random networks with high clustering coefficients (Figs. 1 and 2). The predictions
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FIG. 3. The density pc of cooperators plotted for four different updating rules. The simulations
were performed for the von Neumann square lattice (z = 4), hexagonal lattice (z = 6) and Moore
lattice (z = 8). Reference lines are superimposed (12) for BD and LC, (13) for DB, and (14) for
IM, where the clustering coefficient C was set to C = 0.5 for the von Neumann square lattice,
C = 0.65 for the hexagonal lattice, and C = 0.7 for the Moore lattice. Other parameter values are
the same as in Fig. 1
agree well with the numerical results. Figure 1 shows that when the clustering coefficient
increases, the frequency of the major strategy increases for all four updating rules. Pre-
dictions (12), (13), and (14) suggest the interval of the coexisting region is [z − 2 − C(z −
1)]/[z − C(z − 1)] for BD and LC, and{[z − 2− C(z − 1)](z + 1)}/{[z − C(z − 1)](z − 1)}
for DB and IM. Thus, if C > (z − 2)/(z − 1) the only one strategy can survive for all four
updating rules. Figure 2 shows that the frequency of the majority increases when the degree
z decreases for BD and LC updating rules. Cooperation is enhanced for small z for DB and
IM updating rules.
Figure 3 shows numerical results for three types of two-dimensional lattices. The predic-
tions (12) for BD and LC, (13) for DB, and (14) for IM, were superimposed for reference
where the parameters were set as z = 4 and C = 0.5 for the von Neumann lattice, z = 6 and
C = 0.65 for the hexagonal lattice, and z = 8 and C = 0.7 for the Moore lattice in Fig.3.
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This result suggests that the ‘effective’ cluster coefficients are approximately 0.5, 0.65, and
0.7 rather than the “nominal” values 0, 0.4, and 0.43. The clustering coefficient measures
the density of triangles in a network. This deviation is because of the effect of loops of
length four and above. Cooperator density increases when the degree z decreases for DB
and IM updating rules.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the frequency of the majority increases with the clustering coefficient. In
situations where cooperators and defectors coexist and cooperators are the majority, cluster-
ing enhances cooperative behavior. When cooperators are the minority where cooperators
and defectors coexist, clustering inhibits cooperative behavior. These results are indepen-
dent of the strategy-updating rule. We can explain this tendency intuitively by using the
heterophilicity [24] as follows. From eqs. (3), (4) and (11), the heterophilicity [24] is calcu-
lated as
H :=
pCD
2pCpD
= 1−
1
(z − 1)(1− C)
, (15)
for all four updating rules. It is obvious H < 1, meaning that C have more connections
to D than expected randomly. When the clustering coefficient C increases, heterophilicity
H decreases. In this case, the population is more exclusive, and it is more difficult for
strategies to coexist. Consequently, the parameter region where two strategies can coexist
becomes narrow. We performed numerical simulations for a small world network [15] and a
scale-free network on geographical space [25] (not shown) to confirm the generality of this
result, Essentially the same results were obtained. Unfortunately, a rigorous derivation of
(13) and (14) is not provided and it remains an open problem.
Lastly, we considered the prisoner’s dilemma game, where the payoff matrix is [10]
C D
C
D

 b− c −c
b 0

 . (16)
In this case, mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilibrium, regardless of the values
of the parameters b and c. Thus, only defectors can survive in well-mixed population. In
addition, cooperators cannot survive for BD and LC updating rules. The standard pair
9
approximation for the DB updating rule shows if b/c > z, only cooperators can survive;
conversely, if b/c < z, only defectors can survive [6]. The result is the same in the case of
IM updating, except the threshold is b/c = z + 2. In any case, there is no parameter region
where the two strategies can coexist. Thus, the clustering coefficient has no influence on
the density of cooperators in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In conclusion, the assertion that
lattice structure enhances cooperative behavior is misleading.
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